ABSTRACTDescartes did not use the terms ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities, but a similar distinction emerges from his texts: certain qualities of objects are intrinsic pr...

BackgroundImplementing the routine consultation of patient advance directives in hospital emergency departments and emergency medical services has become essential, given that advance directives constitute the frame of reference for care personalisation and respect for patients’ values and preferences related to healthcare. The aim of this study was to assess the levels and relationship of knowledge and attitudes of nursing and medical professionals towards advance directives in hospital emergency departments and emergency medical services, and to determine the correlated and predictor variables (...) of favourable attitudes towards advance directives.MethodsObservational, descriptive, and cross-sectional study. The study was conducted in the emergency department of a second-level hospital and in the emergency medical service. Data collection was performed from January 2019 to February 2020. The STROBE guidelines were followed for the preparation of the study.ResultsA total of 173 healthcare professionals responded to the questionnaire. Among them, 91.3% considered that they were not sufficiently informed about advance directives, and 74% acknowledged not having incorporated them into their usual practice. Multinomial analysis indicated a statistically significant relationship between the variable emergency medical service and having more favourable attitudes towards consulting the advance directives in their practical application (OR 2.49 [95% CI 1.06–5.88]; p = 0.037) and compliance in complex scenarios (OR 3.65 [95% CI 1.58 − 8.41]; p = 0.002). Working the afternoon and night shift was a predictor variable for obtaining a higher score with respect to attitudes in complex scenarios.ConclusionThere is an association between the level of knowledge that nursing and medical professionals have about advance directives and the scores obtained on the attitude scales at the time of practical implementation and in complex scenarios. This shows that the more knowledge professionals have, the more likely they are to consult patients' advance directives and to respect their wishes and preferences for care and/or treatment. (shrink)

Quality of Life Reach in Medical Care Alcance da qualidade de vida no atendimento médico The term quality of life has increasingly widespread use in biomedical practice, especially in end-of-life situations. Experience shows that the expression is often used with very different —and sometimes conflicting— scopes. The present article presents the results of a literature review that show diverse positions, while delimitating the subject. The analysis compares the terms “quality of life,” “human dignity,” and “value of human life.” Para citar (...) este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Páez G, López-Gabeiras MP, Moreno-D’Anna M. Alcance de la “calidad de vida” en atención médica. Pers Bioet. 2020;24:14-27. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2020.24.1.2 Recibido: 06/11/2019 Aceptado: 04/03/2020 Publicado: 07/05/2020. (shrink)

Pojęcia były zawsze jednym z najważniejszych obiektów badań filozoficznych. Szczególnie duży wkład do teorii analizy pojęć wnieśli przedstawiciele polskiej gałęzi XX-wiecznej filozofii analitycznej, czyli Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej. Badaniom filozoficznym w tej szkole przyświecał postulat jasności myślenia i mowy. Analiza i doskonalenie pojęć oraz języka filozoficznego jako ich nośnika były naturalnym wyrazem programu metodologicznego, jaki formacji tej nadał jej założyciel, Kazimierz Twardowski. W artykule przedstawiona jest procedura rekonstrukcji pojęć, stosowana powszechnie w szkole Twardowskiego. Okazuje się, że pomimo głębokich niekiedy różnic między poszczególnymi (...) przedstawicielami SLW da się wskazać pewne rysy wspólne prowadzonych w szkole badań nad pojęciami. Są to przede wszystkim moment kategorialny i moment konstrukcyjny, ze względu na który całą procedurę najlepiej określić właśnie jako „rekonstrukcję”. Bliżej zostały omówione dwa przykłady rekonstrukcji pojęć: praca Jana Łukasiewicza dotycząca pojęcia przyczyny oraz wyniki Alfreda Tarskiego dotyczące pojęcia prawdy. (shrink)

Mistrz Eckhart, postać niejednokrotnie bardzo kontrowersyjna, cieszy się ogromnym zainteresowaniem zarówno wśród teologów, filozofów, a przede wszystkim mistyków. Głównym powodem tej uwagi jest jego koncepcja dotycząca zjednoczenia mistycznego, która opiera się głównie na zagadnieniu iskierki duszy oraz niższej części duszy, która staje się wręcz tożsama z Bogiem. Według Eckharta z jednej strony jesteśmy zrodzeni, natomiast z drugiej strony nie jesteśmy, ponieważ powinniśmy oczekiwać zrodzenia w niższej części duszy. „Narodzenie Boga w duszy” - tak Mistrz Eckhart określa zjednoczenie mistyczne, które należałoby, (...) według niego, umieścić w swoistych kategoriach przebóstwienia. Źródłem zaś całej idei przebóstwienia jest nic innego, jak silne podobieństwo między Bogiem i człowiekiem, a dokładnie jego duszą. Nietrudno odnaleźć tu liczne podobieństwa, które z łatwością można dostrzec między myślą Eckharta i myślą neoplato- ników pogańskich - Plotyna czy Proklosa. Istnieje wiele przesłanek, że Mistrz Eckhart próbuje połączyć idealistyczną filozofię neoplatońską z czysto racjonalną filozofią Tomasza z Akwinu, jednak aspekty Akwinaty są w myśli Mistrza Eckharta niemal niezauważalne. Wydaje się, że liczne trudności związane z interpretacją jego poglądów wynikają z ewidentnego braku podstaw metafizyki w jego dziełach. Jest to nieco dziwne, biorąc pod uwagę fakt, że Mistrz Eckhart doskonale znał poglądy Tomasza z Akwinu, który w sposóbjednoznaczny wypracował koncepcję bytu.Proces zjednoczenia jest w myśli Eckharta przedstawiony w kontekście poznawania. Intelekt stanowi tę władzę w bycie ludzkim, dzięki któremu może on pozostawać w nieustannym związku z Bogiem, co pozwala mu na wznoszenie się. Droga do zjednoczenia z Bogiem zawsze zatem będzie drogą ku Najwyższemu Intelektowi poprzez doskonalenie intelektu w sobie samym. Jest to jednak proces, który wymaga swoistego wyjścia z siebie samego. Wyjście to polega na swego rodzaju dążeniu do jak największej prostoty, co polega na odrzuceniu wszelkiej różnorodności oraz inności. Pojawia się zatem ubóstwo rozumiane w sposób zupełnie paradoksalny, ponieważ w konsekwencji zjednoczenia z Bogiemjawi się onojako największe bogactwo.Warto jednocześnie pamiętać, że ów mistyczny kontakt z Bogiem nie jest czymś zupełnie zewnętrznym dla człowieka. Otóż zjednoczenie mistyczne nie polega na wznoszeniu się duszy do Boga, lecz na ujawnieniu Boga w niższej części duszy, wyższa bowiem część duszy, czyli iskierka duszy,jużjest tożsama z Bogiem. Narodziny Boga to uczestnictwo niższej części duszy w szczęściu iskierki duszy. Eckhart wyraźnie wskazuje, że są to narodziny Syna w duszy, które jednak nie oddala duszy od Ojca. Jest to nadal ten sam rodzaj jedności. Zostaje wręcz zniesiona wszelka jedno- stkowość człowieka, zaciera się jego tożsamość. Ta ontologiczna jedność z samym Bogiem jest jednocześnie jednością z dobrem w najwyższym wymiarze, dlatego też zacierają się wszelkie dylematy moralne, które rozstrzygają się dzięki zupełnej jedności, w której tożsamość bytu ludzkiego z Bogiem nie ma żadnego zróżnicowania. (shrink)

Mistrz Eckhart, postać niejednokrotnie bardzo kontrowersyjna, cieszy się ogromnym zainteresowaniem zarówno wśród teologów, filozofów, a przede wszystkim mistyków. Głównym powodem tej uwagi jest jego koncepcja dotycząca zjednoczenia mistycznego, która opiera się głównie na zagadnieniu iskierki duszy oraz niższej części duszy, która staje się wręcz tożsama z Bogiem. Według Eckharta z jednej strony jesteśmy zrodzeni, natomiast z drugiej strony nie jesteśmy, ponieważ powinniśmy oczekiwać zrodzenia w niższej części duszy. „Narodzenie Boga w duszy” - tak Mistrz Eckhart określa zjednoczenie mistyczne, które należałoby, (...) według niego, umieścić w swoistych kategoriach przebóstwienia. Źródłem zaś całej idei przebóstwienia jest nic innego, jak silne podobieństwo między Bogiem i człowiekiem, a dokładnie jego duszą. Nietrudno odnaleźć tu liczne podobieństwa, które z łatwością można dostrzec między myślą Eckharta i myślą neoplato- ników pogańskich - Plotyna czy Proklosa. Istnieje wiele przesłanek, że Mistrz Eckhart próbuje połączyć idealistyczną filozofię neoplatońską z czysto racjonalną filozofią Tomasza z Akwinu, jednak aspekty Akwinaty są w myśli Mistrza Eckharta niemal niezauważalne. Wydaje się, że liczne trudności związane z interpretacją jego poglądów wynikają z ewidentnego braku podstaw metafizyki w jego dziełach. Jest to nieco dziwne, biorąc pod uwagę fakt, że Mistrz Eckhart doskonale znał poglądy Tomasza z Akwinu, który w sposóbjednoznaczny wypracował koncepcję bytu.Proces zjednoczenia jest w myśli Eckharta przedstawiony w kontekście poznawania. Intelekt stanowi tę władzę w bycie ludzkim, dzięki któremu może on pozostawać w nieustannym związku z Bogiem, co pozwala mu na wznoszenie się. Droga do zjednoczenia z Bogiem zawsze zatem będzie drogą ku Najwyższemu Intelektowi poprzez doskonalenie intelektu w sobie samym. Jest to jednak proces, który wymaga swoistego wyjścia z siebie samego. Wyjście to polega na swego rodzaju dążeniu do jak największej prostoty, co polega na odrzuceniu wszelkiej różnorodności oraz inności. Pojawia się zatem ubóstwo rozumiane w sposób zupełnie paradoksalny, ponieważ w konsekwencji zjednoczenia z Bogiemjawi się onojako największe bogactwo.Warto jednocześnie pamiętać, że ów mistyczny kontakt z Bogiem nie jest czymś zupełnie zewnętrznym dla człowieka. Otóż zjednoczenie mistyczne nie polega na wznoszeniu się duszy do Boga, lecz na ujawnieniu Boga w niższej części duszy, wyższa bowiem część duszy, czyli iskierka duszy,jużjest tożsama z Bogiem. Narodziny Boga to uczestnictwo niższej części duszy w szczęściu iskierki duszy. Eckhart wyraźnie wskazuje, że są to narodziny Syna w duszy, które jednak nie oddala duszy od Ojca. Jest to nadal ten sam rodzaj jedności. Zostaje wręcz zniesiona wszelka jedno- stkowość człowieka, zaciera się jego tożsamość. Ta ontologiczna jedność z samym Bogiem jest jednocześnie jednością z dobrem w najwyższym wymiarze, dlatego też zacierają się wszelkie dylematy moralne, które rozstrzygają się dzięki zupełnej jedności, w której tożsamość bytu ludzkiego z Bogiem nie ma żadnego zróżnicowania. (shrink)

Do the new sciences of well-being provide knowledge that respects the nature of well-being? This book written from the perspective of philosophy of science articulates how this field can speak to well-being proper and can do so in a way that respects the demands of objectivity and measurement.

Well–being, health and freedom are some of the many phenomena of interest to science whose definitions rely on a normative standard. Empirical generalizations about them thus present a special case of value-ladenness. I propose the notion of a ‘mixed claim’ to denote such generalizations. Against the prevailing wisdom, I argue that we should not seek to eliminate them from science. Rather, we need to develop principles for their legitimate use. Philosophers of science have already reconciled values with objectivity in several (...) ways, but none of the existing proposals are suitable for mixed claims. Using the example of the science of well-being, I articulate a conception of objectivity for this science and for mixed claims in general. _1_ Introduction _2_ What Are Mixed Claims? _3_ Mixed Claims Are Different _3.1_ Values as reasons to pursue science _3.2_ Values as agenda-setters _3.3_ Values as ethical constraints on research protocols _3.4_ Values as arbiters between underdetermined theories _3.5_ Values as determinants of standards of confirmation _3.6_ Values as sources of wishful thinking and fraud _4_ Mixed Claims Should Stay _4.1_ Against Nagel _5_ The Dangers of Mixed Claims _6_ The Existing Accounts of Objectivity _6.1_ The perils of impartiality _7_ Objectivity for Mixed Claims _8_ Three Rules _8.1_ Unearth the value presuppositions in methods and measures _8.2_ Check if value presuppositions are invariant to disagreements _8.3_ Consult the relevant parties _9_ Conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate composition models of incarnation, according to which Christ is a compound of qualitatively and numerically different constituents. We focus on three-part models, according to which Christ is composed of a divine mind, a human mind, and a human body. We consider four possible relational structures that the three components could form. We argue that a ‘hierarchy of natures’ model, in which the human mind and body are united to each other in the normal way, and (...) in which they are jointly related to the divine mind by the relation of co-action, is the most metaphysically plausible model. Finally, we consider the problem of how Christ can be a single person even when his components may be considered persons. We argue that an Aristotelian metaphysics, according to which identity is a matter of function, offers a plausible solution: Christ's components may acquire a radically new identity through being parts of the whole, which enables them to be reidentified as parts, not persons. (shrink)

The 1994 US spectrum auction is now a paradigmatic case of the successful use of microeconomic theory for policy-making. We use a detailed analysis of it to review standard accounts in philosophy of science of how idealized models are connected to messy reality. We show that in order to understand what made the design of the spectrum auction successful, a new such account is required, and we present it here. Of especial interest is the light this sheds on the issue (...) of progress in economics. In particular, it enables us to get clear on exactly what has been progressing, and on exactly what theory has – and has not – contributed to that. This in turn has important implications for just what it is about economic theory that we should value. (shrink)

Polska powieść kryminalna, szczególnie powstająca po roku 1989, wywołuje co najmniej dwa pytania badawcze. Pierwsze o chronologię literatury polskiej, a zarazem o uzależnienie jej rozwoju od przemian politycznych. Drugie o to, czy faktycznie zmiany takie miały (bądź mają) wpływ na kwestie np. formalne związane z kształtem tejże literatury. Zmiany polityczne mogły zapewne wpłynąć na podejmowanie tematów dotąd niemożliwych do opisu. Niniejsze studium ma na celu opis oraz analizę polskiej powieści kryminalnej z nieco innej perspektywy, a mianowicie opisu jej jako pewnego (...) obiektu w znaczeniu, jaki nadał temu pojęciu Nicolai Hartmann. Stąd kwestie chronologiczne nie odegrają tu większej roli; będą traktowane jako pewien parametr pomocniczy. Natomiast artykuł podkreśla znaczenie tezy, że powieść kryminalna staje się, właśnie po roku 1989, powieścią o charakterze obyczajowo-psychologicznym. Także coraz silniej przejawia się w niej tendencja do czegoś, co sami autorzy określają jako „komedia kryminalna”. Artykuł zawiera zatem zarysowanie problemu badawczego (dzieło literackie jako obiekt), zaś główna teza to niezależność kwestii formalnych od problematyki przemian politycznych. Przyjęte w artykule metody badawcze to przede wszystkim opis obiektu, resp. dzieła literackiego i takich jego cech, jak: miejsce akcji (konkretne i opisane precyzyjnie bądź schematycznie), język protagonistów/antagonistów/narratora (konwencjonalny lub zindywidualizowany, z aluzjami intertekstowymi), postacie konwencjonalne lub zindywidualizowane, zagadka (najważniejsza, lub pretekstowa, czasem odkrywa drugie dno). Staram się wykazać, że zmiany polityczne wpłynęły na podejmowanie tematów dotąd niemożliwych do opisu. Natomiast same kwestie przemian politycznych na sferę kompozycji mają tylko wpływ głównie w warstwie językowej utworów. (shrink)

Difficulty is often treated as blame-mitigating, and even exculpating. But on some occasions difficulty seems to have little or no bearing on our assessments of moral responsibility, and can even exacerbate it. In this paper, I argue that the relevance (and irrelevance) of difficulty with regard to assessments of moral responsibility is best understood via Quality of Will accounts. I look at various ways of characterising difficulty – including via sacrifice, effort, skill and ‘trying’ – and set out to demonstrate (...) that these factors are only blame-mitigating where, and to the extent that, they complicate ascriptions of insufficient concern. Matters become more complex, however, when we turn to difficult circumstances that seem to generate such objectionable attitudes. This is arguably the case with epistemic difficulty and certain instances of moral ignorance. Here I argue that certain difficult circumstances diminish the sense in which false moral beliefs are genuinely revelatory of the agents who hold them. In particular, I draw on the distinction between difficulty that generates objectionable attitudes, and objectionable attitudes that generate difficulty. I argue that the former, but not the latter, can plausibly be viewed as blame mitigating, and that this would apply to (limited) cases of moral ignorance. (shrink)

This book defends an account of justice to nonhuman beings – i.e., to animals, plants etc. – also known as ecological or interspecies justice, and which lies in the intersection of environmental political theory and environmental ethics. More specifically, against the background of the current extinction crisis this book defends a global non-ranking biocentric theory of distributive ecological/interspecies justice to wild nonhuman beings, because the extinction crisis does not only need practical solutions, but also an account of how it is (...) the outcome of large-scale injustice. This book not only provides a novel theoretical framework that supports such a claim, but it also develops the theoretical tools to find just compromises between the entitlements of intraspecies and intra-human global distributive justice to ecological space for the purpose of working towards a vision of just conservation. -/- Content: 1. Introducing Ecological Justice 2. Political Non-Ranking Biocentrism 3. The Community of Justice 4. The Currency of Distributive Justice 5. The Principles of Distributive Justice 6. Ecological Justice and the Capabilities Approach 7. Biodiversity Loss: An Injustice? 8. Who Owns the Earth? 9. Visions of Just Conservation 10. Outlook for Implementation . (shrink)

This article is a mutual introduction of the science of well-being to philosophy of science and an explanation of how the two disciplines can benefit each other. In the process, I argue that the science of well-being is not helpfully viewed as a social or a natural, but rather as a mixed, science. Hence, its methodology will have to attend to its specific features. I discuss two of its methodological problems: justifying the role of values, and validating measures. I suggest (...) that tackling them calls for developing mid-level rather than high theories of well-being. (shrink)

Kant's radical criticism of the passions has a central but largely overlooked moral-psychological component: for Kant, the passions promote a kind of self-deception he calls ‘rationalizing’. In analysing the connection between passion and rationalizing self-deception, I identify and reconstruct two essential traits of Kant's conception of the passions. I argue (1) that rationalizing self-deception, according to Kant, contributes massively to the emergence and consolidation of passions. It aims to resolve a psychological conflict between passion and moral duty when in fact, (...) it does not resolve but perpetuates this conflict. I then argue (2) that rationalizing does not necessarily aim to devalue moral duty, as Kant seems to suggest in the Groundwork. It can also aim to revalue the ‘counterweight’. By analysing Kant's presentation of several individual passions in the Anthropology, I demonstrate that rationalizing here is concerned with elevating these passions and making them pass as morally (or at least prudentially) justified. (shrink)

Recently, there has been much talk of impact investing. Around the world, specialized intermediaries have appeared, mainstream financial players and governments have become involved, renowned universities have included impact investing courses in their curriculum, and a myriad of practitioner contributions have been published. Despite all this activity, conceptual clarity remains an issue: The absence of a uniform definition, the interchangeable use of alternative terms and unclear boundaries to related concepts such as socially responsible investment are being criticized. This article aims (...) to contribute to a better understanding of impact investing, which could help foster this specific investment style and guide further academic research. To do so, it investigates a large number of academic and practitioner works, highlighting areas of similarity and inconsistency on three levels: definitional, terminological, and strategic. Our research shows that, on a general level, heterogeneity—especially definitional and strategic—is less pronounced than expected. Yet, our research also reveals critical issues that need to be clarified to advance the field and increase its credibility. First and foremost, this includes the characteristics required of impact investees, notably whether they need to be organizations that prioritize their non-financial mission over the business side. Our results indicate that there may be different schools of thoughts concerning this matter. (shrink)

Building on the author's earlier work, this paper argues that language is a key issue in understanding human emotions and that treating English emotion terms as valid analytical tools continues to be a roadblock in the study of emotions. Further, it shows how the methodology developed by the author and colleagues, known as NSM (from Natural Semantic Metalanguage), allows us to break free of the “shackles” (Barrett, 2006) of English psychological terms and explore human emotions from a culture-independent perspective. The (...) use of NSM makes it possible to study human emotions from a genuinely cross-linguistic and cross-cultural, as well as a psychological, perspective and thus “opens up new possibilities for the scientific understanding of subjectivity and psychological experience” (Goddard, 2007). (shrink)

We can understand implicit bias as a person’s disposition to evaluate members of a social group in a less favorable light than members of another social group, without intending to do so. If we understand it this way, we should not presuppose a one-size-fits-all answer to the question of how implicit cognitive states lead to skewed evaluations of other people. The focus of this paper is on implicit bias in considered decisions. It is argued that we have good reasons to (...) assume that imagination plays a vital role in decision making. If this assumption is correct, it offers an explanation for implicit bias in many considered decisions: Human beings who have been frequently exposed to stereotypes have stereotype-congruent expectations as part of their background knowledge. They feed into their imagination, sometimes without their awareness. This model would allow us to explain the key characteristics of implicit bias without recurring to any unconscious attitudes over and above such background knowledge. (shrink)

Editorial Board: Karl P. Ameriks, Margaret Atherton, Frederick Beiser, Fabien Capeillères, Faustino Fabbianelli, Daniel Garber, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Steven Nadler, Alan Nelson, Christof Rapp, Ursula Renz, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Denis Thouard, Paul Ziche, Günter Zöller The series publishes monographs and essay collections devoted to the history of philosophy as well as studies in the theory of writing the history of philosophy. A special emphasis is placed on the contextualization of philosophical historiography into the areas of the history of science, culture, and (...) the wider scope of intellectual history. (shrink)

Different arguments in favor of the moral relevance of the concept of biodiversity (e.g., in terms of its intrinsic or instrumental value) face a range of serious difficulties, despite that biodiversity constitutes a central tenet of many environmentalist practices and beliefs. That discrepancy is considerable for the debate on potential moral reasons for protecting biodiversity. This paper adds a new angle by focusing on the potential of the concept of natural otherness—specifically individual and process otherness in nature—for providing additional moral (...) reasons in favor of the protection of biodiversity as variety. Four arguments are presented. Two arguments draw on the individual natural otherness of nonhuman living beings and two additional arguments draw on the process otherness of active nature. The upshot is that each of these arguments—if successful—provides a moral reason in favor of the protection of biodiversity. (shrink)

Computational explanations focus on information processing required in specific cognitive capacities, such as perception, reasoning or decision-making. These explanations specify the nature of the information processing task, what information needs to be represented, and why it should be operated on in a particular manner. In this article, the focus is on three questions concerning the nature of computational explanations: What type of explanations they are, in what sense computational explanations are explanatory and to what extent they involve a special, “independent” (...) or “autonomous” level of explanation. In this paper, we defend the view computational explanations are genuine explanations, which track non-causal/formal dependencies. Specifically, we argue that they do not provide mere sketches for explanation, in contrast to what for example Piccinini and Craver :283–311, 2011) suggest. This view of computational explanations implies some degree of “autonomy” for the computational level. However, as we will demonstrate that does not make this view “computationally chauvinistic” in a way that Piccinini or Kaplan :339–373, 2011) have charged it to be. (shrink)

Insight problem solving was investigated with the matchstick algebra problems developed by Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and Rhenius (1999). These problems are false equations expressed with Roman numerals that can be made true bymoving one matchstick. In a first group participants examined a static two-dimensional representation of the false algebraic expression and told the experimenter which matchstick should be moved. In a second group, participants interacted with a three-dimensional representation of the false equation. Success rates in the static group for different (...) problem types replicated the pattern of data reported in Knoblich et al. (1999). However, participants in the interactive group were significantly more likely to achieve insight. Problem-solving success in the static group was best predicted by performance on a test of numeracy, whereas in the interactive group it was best predicted by performance on a test of visuo-spatial reasoning. Implications for process models of problem solving are discussed. (shrink)

Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker's (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker's words from constituting evidence for the hearer's belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to (...) address two more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice: its resistance to counterevidence and the steps involved in overcoming prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice, based on the recent perspective of hinge epistemology, to help clarify these aspects. According to the hinge account, prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and cannot count as evidence for belief. (shrink)

Anna Alexandrova on value judgements and the measurement of well-being.

I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of the logical vocabulary. In particular, I argue that the apparent rivalry between classical and relevant logic can be resolved, given that both logics capture and formalize normative and legitimate senses of logical consequence: classical logic encodes “follows from” as truth preservation and captures the truth conditions of the logical constants, while relevant logic encodes a notion of “follows from” which, apart from preserving truth, avoids (...) the violation of certain Gricean maxims and captures a different inferential role for the same logical constants, enriching their meaning pragmatically. (shrink)

Semantics of natural language; includes some Australian language examples.

Unlike the question of whether self-deception can be understood on the model of other-deception, the relationship between the two phenomena at the level of practice is hardly ever explored. Other-deception can support self-deception and vice versa. Self-deception often affects not only the beliefs and behavior of the self-deceiving person but also the beliefs and behavior of others who may become accomplices of self-deception. As I will show, however, it is difficult to describe this supportive relationship between self-deception and the deception (...) of others without conceptual contradiction. While “deflationary” approaches offer a convincing way to avoid the so-called paradoxes of self-deception, they do not resolve the conceptual tensions that arise here. I conclude by outlining a solution. (shrink)

The author argues that the so-called “basic emotions”, such as happiness, fear or anger, are in fact cultural artifacts of the English language, just as the Ilongot concept of liget, or the Ifaluk concept of song, are the cultural artifacts of Ilongot and Ifaluk. It is therefore as inappropriate to talk about human emotions in general in terms of happiness, fear, or anger as it would be to talk about them in terms of liget or song. However, this does not (...) mean that we cannot penetrate into the emotional world of speakers of languages other than our own. Nor does it mean that there cannot be any universal human emotions. Universality of emotions is an open issue which requires further investigation. For this further investigation to be fully productive, it has to be undertaken from a universal, language and culture-independent perspective; and it has to be carried out in a universalist framework that is language and culture-independent. The author proposes for this purpose the “natural semantic metalanguage” based on universal (or near-universal) semantic primitives (or near-primitives), developed over two decades by herself and colleagues, and she argues that the use of this metalanguage facilitates such a perspective and offers such a framework. (shrink)

The growing abundance of medical technologies has led to laments over doctors’ sensory de-skilling, technologies viewed as replacing diagnosis based on sensory acumen. The technique of percussion has become emblematic of the kinds of skills considered lost. While disappearing from wards, percussion is still taught in medical schools. By ethnographically following how percussion is taught to and learned by students, this article considers the kinds of bodies configured through this multisensory practice. I suggest that three kinds of bodies arise: skilled (...) bodies; affected bodies; and resonating bodies. As these bodies are crafted, I argue that boundaries between bodies of novices and bodies they learn from blur. Attending to an overlooked dimension of bodily configurations in medicine, self-perception, I show that learning percussion functions not only to perpetuate diagnostic craft skills but also as a way of knowing of, and through, the resource always at hand; one’s own living breathing body. (shrink)

This review provides an overview of the ethics of extinctions with a focus on the Western analytical environmental ethics literature. It thereby gives special attention to the possible philosophical grounds for Michael Soulé’s assertion that the untimely ‘extinction of populations and species is bad’. Illustrating such debates in environmental ethics, the guiding question for this review concerns why – or when – anthropogenic extinctions are bad or wrong, which also includes the question of when that might not be the case (...) (i.e. which extinctions are even desirable). After providing an explanation of the disciplinary perspective taken (section “Introduction”), the concept of extinction and its history within that literature are introduced (section “Understanding extinction”). Then, in section “Why (or when) might anthropogenic extinctions be morally problematic?”, different reasons for why anthropogenic extinctions might be morally problematic are presented based on the loss of species’ value, harm to nonhuman individuals, the loss of valuable biological variety and duties to future generations. This section concludes by also considering cases where anthropogenic extinctions might be justified. Section “How to respond to extinctions?” then addresses a selection of topics concerning risks and de-extinction technologies. Finally, the section on “Extinction studies” introduces other viewpoints on the ethics of extinction from the extinction studies literature, followed by the “Conclusion”. (shrink)

Biological conservation practices and approaches take many forms. Conservation projects do not only differ in their aims and methods, but also concerning their conceptual and normative background assumptions and their underlying motivations and objectives. We draw on philosophical distinctions from the ethics of conservation to explain variances of different positions on conservation projects along six dimensions: (1) conservation ideals, (2) intervention intuitions, (3) the moral considerability of nonhuman beings, (4) environmental values, (5) views on nature and (6) human roles in (...) nature. The result is a map of the moral landscape of biological conservation, on which these six dimensions are layered. This map functions as a heuristic tool to understand conceptual and normative foundations of specific conservation projects, which we will illustrate with four paradigmatic examples: the Pisavaara Strict Nature Reserve, Predator Free New Zealand, the Oostvaardersplassen Nature Reserve and the Great Green Wall Project. With this map as a heuristic tool, we aim to conceptually illuminate disagreement and clarify misunderstandings between representatives of different environmental protection strategies and to show that the same project can be supported (or criticised) on different grounds. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper adds to efforts to retrieve the long-neglected philosophical contributions of Karoline von Günderrode, and is one of the first to seriously address the political commitments in Günderrode’s work, especially regarding revolution. This idea gains an unusual status in the context of Günderrode’s metaphysics, and is key to understanding the connections between Günderrode’s more obviously philosophical writings and her literary work. I argue that Günderrode’s concept of revolution resembles, in some respects, the ideas of other thinkers of her (...) time, but has ramifications for conceiving of human individuals and their relationships to society and nature that are unique to Günderrode. First, I use a comparison with the work of contemporaries on revolution to justify interpreting Günderrode’s metaphysics in relation to her thought on politics. Günderrode often masks her political thought in the form of plays, and the paper next considers the theme of revolution in her plays Muhammad, the Prophet of Mecca, and Udohla. Lastly, the paper contrasts Günderrode’s position on revolution to claims by Herder and Fichte, arguing that Günderrode’s conception of a cycle of enhancement and decay of natural forces, political power and social cohesion differs from androcentric models that emphasize the development of consciousness. (shrink)

My aim in the paper will be to better understand what faultless disagreement could possibly consist in and what speakers disagree over when they faultlessly do so. To that end, I will first look at various examples of faultless disagreement. Since I will eventually claim that different forms of faultless disagreement can be modeled semantically on different forms of context-sensitivity I will, in a second step, discuss three different semantic accounts that all promise to successfully accommodate certain forms of context-sensitivity: (...) Indexical Contextualism, Nonindexcal Contextualism and Radical Relativism. Focussing on the controversy between Indexical and Nonindexical Contextualists the remainder of the paper will be devoted to the question which theory is best suited to handle what kind of disagreement. (shrink)

The reception of the translations of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian works at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century promoted a new understanding of the sciences as specialized fields of knowledge. The huge amount of translations required a new organization of knowledge, which included novel subjects and categories. Among these there is a very special case, namely the pseudo-Aristotelian De plantis, translated from Arabic into Latin and then back into Greek to be re-translated into Latin again. De plantis was included (...) in the new curriculum in Ripoll 109, and constituted the main source for botanical studies until the sixteenth century. Throughout this paper we will explore the reception and impact of De plantis in both the Arabic and the Latin traditions. We aim to show its foundational role in the development of botany as a theoretical discipline within the natural sciences. (shrink)

There are two main ways of understanding the function of surrogate decision making in a legal context: the Best Interests Standard and the Substituted Judgment Standard. First, we will argue that the Best Interests Standard is difficult to apply to unconscious patients. Application is difficult regardless of whether they have ever been conscious. Second, we will argue that if we accept the least problematic explanation of how unconscious patients can have interests, we are also obliged to accept that the Substituted (...) Judgment Standard can be coherently applied to patients who have never been conscious at the same extent as the Best Interests Standard. We then argue that acknowledging this result is important in order to show patients respect. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe paper argues for the restricted viability of the concept of style in the history of science. Since historians of science borrow this term from art history or the sociology of knowledge, the paper outlines its emergence and function in these disciplines, in order to show that the need for ever subtler stylistic distinctions in historical description inevitably leads to the dissolution of the concept of style itself.“Style” will be defined in predominantly cognitive or technical terms when imputed to (...) an individual; in social or moral terms when thought to be carried by some collective entity. Both descriptions are given normative interpretations. A good individual style, then, is regarded as the pledge for valid knowledge or insights of a “higher order,” while a collective style, understood as the vehicle of successful intra group communication, involves the acceptance of certain rhetorical norms and/or socially shared values that are supposed to structure that style. “National styles” belong to the latter category; the emergence of this dubious notion can best be explained in sociological terms.If historians of science insist on adopting the concept of style, they will have to agree on its meaning. The paper concludes, therefore, with a rough typology of its most frequent meanings and uses. (shrink)

I distinguish between the classical Gricean approach to conversational implicatures, which I call the action-theoretic approach, and the approach to CIs taken in contemporary cognitive science. Once we free ourselves from the AT account, and see implicating as a form of what I call “conversational tailoring”, we can more easily see the many different ways that CIs arise in conversation. I will show that they arise not only on the basis of a speaker’s utterance of complete sentences but also on (...) the basis of sub-sentential clauses—cases of so-called embedded implicatures—as well as from discourse segments containing several sentences—cases that Geurts calls ‘multiplicatures’. I will argue that they arise also from contents that are themselves implicit, such as presupposed contents or other implicatures. All but the first sort of case are difficult for the traditional Gricean AT account to handle, whereas they fall naturally out of an account that sees conversational participants as engaged in conversational tailoring—i.e., as engaged in a process of shaping informational and discourse structural properties of utterances in their successive conversational turns, and hence shaping their interlocutors’ cognitive environments. (shrink)

Research involving children or other incompetent subjects who are deemed unable to provide informed consent is complex, particularly in the case of research that does not directly benefit the research subjects themselves. The Helsinki Declaration, the World Medical Association's landmark document for research ethics, therefore states that incompetent research subjects must not be included in such research unless it entails only minimal risk and minimal burden. In this paper, we argue that now that research in these groups is expected to (...) expand, this undifferentiated minimal risk and burden requirement does not suffice any more. In the upcoming revision of the Declaration, the paragraph at stake should be refined in such a way that it is not unnecessarily restrictive or more permissive than can be ethically justified. Our first recommendation is to stimulate research ethics committees to identify more accurately those risks and burdens that the research subjects must undergo solely for research purposes by distinguishing between two types of study procedures instead of between two types of studies. Our second recommendation is to allow for exceptions to the minimal risk and burden requirement in cases of exceptionally valuable studies that involve subjects who can give their assent to participate in the study and that involve at most a minor increase over minimal risk and/or burden. (shrink)

Both Novalis and Günderrode provide grounds for a number of different kinds of hope. The first part of this chapter briefly sketches the most obvious of these: the hope for union with loved ones after death. This section also explains Günderrode’s metaphysics, which entails significant differences from Novalis in the other areas of hope that she identifies. Part two explores “epistemological hope”: the hope for knowledge or experience of that which lies outside the limitations of reason. Part three considers Günderrode’s (...) “moral hope,” which emerges from her critique of Kantian morality. Finally, parts four and five consider “political hope” and “ontological hope,” i.e., hope for improvement in the world as a whole and human society in particular. For Novalis, this famously takes the form of “raising,” “Romanticizing” or “cultivating,” effected by human beings. In Günderrode, this kind of improvement is largely beyond human control (although human beings can contribute to it), leaving us in a state of hopeful ambiguity regarding the possibility of the eventual realization of an “immortal ideal” for the earth and the establishment of ideal human communities. (shrink)